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Establishing a Total Safety Culture

ESTABLISHING A TOTAL SAFETY CULTURE
MTHINA FLIGHTDEPARTMENT
Willem J. Homan, William G. Rantz, and Blair R Balden
This article will present behavior-based principles and procedures that can be successfully applied to change safety
attitudes in a Flight Department. First, lirmtations and flaws of the human condition are discussed, and three basic ways
employees can learn safe behavior are addressed. Next, Crew Resource Management is proposed as a tool to increase
overall safety in Business Aviation. Safety is then reviewed in the context of the overall goals of the corporation and the
cost of doing business. Senior Corporatemanagement is identiiied as holding the key to the successful and safe operation
of the corporate Flight Department. Finally,criticalissues surrounding Corporate Culture and the ultimate goal of a Total
Safety Culture are discussed. Recommendations are then made to increase the overall safety level of the Business
Aviation environment.

INTRODUCTION
Business Aviation has grown extensively over the past 20
years, and the industry's safety record has improved along the
way. In fact, NBAA (1998) data show that in 1997 companies
operated more than 18,300 turbine-powered business aircraft
worldwide, or three times as many aircraft as in 1978.
Furthermore, the safety statistics of corporate Flight
Departments is superior to that of air taxi operators, and
comparable to that of major airlines. With an accident rate of
.23 per 100,000hours of operations and a fatality rate of 0.06
per 100,000 hours of operations Business Aviation is indeed
very safe (NBAA, 1998). This data campares with an accident
rate of 4.2 and a fatality rate of .81 in 1983 (NBAA, 1994).
The increased use of two-man flight crews, standardized
recurrency training, and more sophisticatedflight equipment
has contributed sigdicantly to the enhancement of safety in
the Business Aviation industry. Does this mean that all is
well? Definitively not!
With the increase in IraiEc that is expected in the foreseeable
future, the only way to keep the accident rate down is to
concentrate with a vengeance on safety standards. Until all
planes retura safely to their home base, there will be room for
improvement. The question is how do we achieve ultimate
safety in an error-prone environment? The answer may lie in
the prioritization of safety at all levels, making sure the
concept permeates the entire organization fiom the
Boardroom to the Flight Department and from the
maintenance hangar to the cockpit. This daunting task is
complex and, contrary to popular belief, not easily
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accomplished. We will fnst look at safety at the personal level
and follow up with a more organizational approach to
achieving ultimate safety. Challenges in the areas of personal
psychology and Corporate Culture wiU be addressed, along
with recommendations to assist Senior Corporate
Management in reaching the target of zero accidents at the
Flight Department level.
HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND SAFETY
Most of us like to think of safety as a type of behavior that
comes natural to us. Actually, the opposite is true. It is often
more common and convenient for people to take risks.Since
accidents tend to occur infrequently, it is not surprising that
march indicates a natural human tendency for employees to
rely on quick and easy shortcuts to accomplish tasks in the
workplace. Also, taking chances and living-on-the-edge is fun
and exhilaratmg,while pursuing safe behavior can be dull and
boring. This is true both on and off the job. Thus, at the
individual level, we fight a constant battle between human
nature and common sense. Defensive strategies have been
developed to help employees cope with this urge to take
chances and do things their own way instead of using safetycentered standard operating procedures. More on-the-job
training comes to mind. Reducing peer pressure to take risks
is another. This is particularly true for the pilot profession
where demands by pilots "pushing the envelope" can coerce
a cautious colleague into taking risks (Transport Canada,
1996). In the end, an organizationalapproach is required to
make safety a way of life in the worblace.
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THE BEHAVIOR-BASED SAFETY APPROACH
The behavior-based approach to safety focuses on the
observable actions of employees and the organizational setting
that influence these actions. This safety theory seems quite
suitable since 80% of all aviation related accidents result fiom
human error. The method focuses on both personal on-the-job
behaviors as well as on the orgauizationalsetting that supports
these behaviors. No initial blame is assigned and errors are
viewed in the context of a comprehensive analysis (Geller,
1996). This is very different from the more traditional way of
handling safety mishaps where investigations by corporate
management resulted in assigning blame f?om the start to
employees or conditions. The behavior-based safety approach
is proactive and preventive in nature. It is a process of
iden-g
problems and gathering and analpng data to
improve conditions in the workplace. Removing barriers to
communication and providing feedback is critical in this
process. Ultimately7the goal is to establish a continued level
of awareness, leading to a total safety culture that will
permeate the organization.
IMPROVING PERSONAL SAFETY ATTITUDES
Jensen (1989) identified five hazardous attitudes that can
jeopardize safety in any aviation environment.Anti-authority
or an attitude of "don't tell me!" is found in people who don't
like anyone telling them what to do. Clearly, this attitude can
affect aviation safety. Impulsivity, or the "do something
quickly" attitude, is the thought pattern of people who
frequently feel the need to do something, anydung,
immediately. They do not stop to think about what they are
about to do and feel that it is too late to locate the checklist or
repair manual to do the task in a safe and structured fashion.
They do the &st thing that comes to mind. Invulnerability, or
the "it won't happen to me7'attitude, shows up in people who
feel that accidents happen to others but never to them. Pilots
or Flight Department technicians who think this way are more
likely to take chances and may jeopardize safety for the entire
operation. Then there is the Macho attitude, which is
exhibitedby those who ate always trying to prove that they are
better than anyone else. They take risks to "prove7'themselves
and impress their coworkers. Fmdly, there is the attitude of
Resignation, where employees don't see themselves as
making a great deal of Merence. They are along for the ride.
Eventually, my of these dangerous attitudes will result in poor
and unsafe performance.
Awareness of the five dangerous attitudes is the fist step in
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eljmiuating them fiom our human judgment. Thoughts similar
to the ones deskbed above are actually common and normal.
When we are able to identlfy these thoughts and feelings, we
can then focus on counteracting them. First, learning to
examine our own thinking and control our own behavior is
critical in this process. Second, it is important that human
performance limitations are identified and that everyone
accepts the fact that human errors will occur. As long as we
are dealing with humans, there is simply no perfection.
Change does not come easily and constant striving is required.
For example, attitudes of invulnerability are often dBcult to
eradicate in aviation personnel even after extensive crew
training (Merritt & Helmreich, 1996). On the hangar floor,
similar attitudes may prevail when it becomes tedious and
inconvenient to follow elaborate safety rules. Nevertheless,
the acceptance and awareness of our human condition will go
a long way in addressmg serious mistakes before they become
catastrophic.
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Crew Resource Management (CRM) has traditionally been
defined as the effective use of all available resources. The
concept was designed to reduce human factor-related
accidents and to improve the human-machine interface by
enhancing teamwork, decision making, and situational
awareness on the flight deck (Cooper, White & Lauber,
1980).Over the years the evohring field of CRM has widened
its focus fiom flight crews to cabin crews to maintenance
technicians. CRM cmently includes specialized training for
most types of aviation personnel. From dispatchers (Dispatch
Resource Management) (FAA, 1995) to maintenance
personnel (Maintenance Resource Management) (FAA,
1997), CRM has been introdwedjust about everywhere in the
organization. Along the way, CRM lrahing became
synonymous with the creation of a more friendly work
emironmat The main objective of reducing potentially fatal
ermrs was often overlooked. Recently, aviation psychologists
redehed CRM as a critical form of Emor Management. This
perspective presupposes that human errors are inevitable, but
as long as the resulting situation is managed properly, safety
can be maintained. Helmreich (1996) identified three ways to
control and minimize human errors. First, there is the total
avoidance of error through proper training. Next, the trapping
of errors or eliminating the mistakes is identified. Finally,
there is the mitigation of errors or controlling the
consequencesof the errors that have been made. Clearly, this
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three-step process of risk management is an excellent
approach to acheve ultimate safety. The increased perception
and the associated attitudinal changes should be part of that
process.
THE PURPOSE OF THE FIRM
There is a general assumption among safety experts that
incidents and accidents in the workplace are primarily a result
of questionable decision making by high-level managers
(McSween, 1995). The main goal of senior management is to
produce a product or provide a service and do so in the most
profitable way possible to increase the wealth of the
shareholders. Management also has the obligation to do this
with the highest degree of safety. There may be
circumstances, though, where, at least in the short term, a
conflict of interest exists between production and safety.
Reason (1990) identified two perceptional factors that show
why t h ~ occurs:
s
1. Certainty of outcome: Resources directed at
improvingproduction (service) have certain outcomes. Those
aimed at enhancing safety do not.
2. Nature of feedback: Feedback generated by the
pursuit of production (senice) is rapid, clear, and compelling.
That which is associated with the pursuit of safety is largely
negative, intermittent, and only compelling after a major
accident or string of incidents.
As a result, management often focuses on production
(or service), assuming that safety will take care of itself. The
fact that very few unsafe acts actually result in damage or
injury supports this line of thinking. What follows is that in
h&ly safeguarded work environments, like aircraft cockpits
or aviation maintenance hangars, complacency may set in
among the employees. In cases like these, it would actually
take an unusual chain of events for a situation to develop into
something disas@ous. This is often referred to as the errorchain (Reason,1990). For example, one of the most common
accident scenarios involves the deliberate disabling of
engineered safety features by operators in pursuit of what, at
the time, seems a perfectly sensible goal (disengaging an autopilot to expedite an approach). On other occasions, safety is
compromised because the operators have an erroneous
perception of the situation. With pilots, this may lead to
situaiional awareness problems. In the case of mechanics, the
result may be the installation of the wrong aircraft part. This
makes the pursuit of safety in any organization a continuous
challenge.

CORPORATE MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY
It is easy for safety experts to blame senior level
management for problems with safety. Why does this occur?
Why is there often the perceived lack of safety awareness on
the part of management? The answer may lie in the way
managers are educated and trained (Erickson, 1997). Senior
managers tend to be graduates of business schools where
programs focus on Finance, Marketing, Operations, and
Production. In these programs, little, if any, attention is given
to the management of safety. Furthermore, MBAs at major
firms receive corporate training only about the companies'
product-line and services. How to conduct business in a safe
and secure fashion is only incidental to their business
aclivitiies. Moreover, management often perceives safety as a
cost to doing business, a cost that interferes with the shortterm goals of the company. ILIthe end, the safety management
task is left to the Safety Ofticer.This person is often the only
one in the firm with any formal training in the field of safety.
Depending on his or her authority level within the
organizaton, safety issues and suggestions may or may not be
taken seriously. Finally, even when companies have highranking safety officials, how well do they understand the
specific issues m u n d i n g aviation safety? As a result, these
barriers and issues concerning safety in the aviation
department often result in only limited acceptance and
participation by corporate managers.
CORPORATE AVIATION SAFETY
In a recent editorial, John W. Olcott (1997), President of the
National Business Aircraft Association, stated that Business
aviation offers the opportmity to be the safest form of
transportation for company personnel, with no exceptions.
Only business aviation allows a company to control all the
factors affecting travel safety, such as pilot and mechanic
hiring, operating procedures, equipment selection,
maintenance, scheduling, dispatch, enroute diversion, and
most certainly training. @. 1)
This statement implies that senior management holds the key
to the successll operation of its Flight Department, and when
it comes to aviation safety, management is in control of its
own destiny. Clearly, the potential for ultimate safety exists,
but what about the reality? What is happening at major
mporatim that can jeopardize the safety of business flying?
The answer lies hidden inside of the same corporations that so
treasure their Flight Departments. It has to do w i t . the nature
of the corporate enterprise, economic survival of the fittest,
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and increasing the shareholders' wealth. Actually, it has a lot
to do with financial gain and very little with aviation. It is
about Corporate Culture and how modern enterprises operate
in the corporatejungle.
CORPORATE CULTURE
For most of us, the term Corporate Culture hints at an
elusive concept to be understood only by organizational
behaviorists. When we rephrase this term to "the way we do
things around here," then it makes sense. It is basically about
social behavior in the workplace. Merritt and Helmreich
(1996) identified two important and distinct components of
Corporate Culture. On the surface there are the recognizable
visible elements of behavior, such as dress codes and layout
of o& space. Then there is the deeper structure, consisting
of the values and beliefs that control the personal behavior of
the workForce.
Within the corporate structure, management assumptions
fonn the foundation of its culture. These assumptions reveal
management's values or standads about how they do business
and how they expect their employees to conduct themselves.
Through management actions, Corporate Culture has a direct
influence on the work environment. Furthermore, a f m
maintains its values and beliefs by rewarding the employees
who comply. Behavioral science tells us that actions that are
rewarded wiU be repeated, as they are rewarded and repeated,
they become unconscious. At this point rewarded behavior
becomes part of the Corporate Culture (Erickson, 1997).
Corporate Cultures are W c u l t to change, and modifying
them is a real challenge.A crisis is often necessary to produce
major change m the behavior of employees. Mergers and buyouts tend to have that effect, because they rock the foundation
of the enterprise and affect everybody. More subtle changes
in Corporate Culture can also be achieved by bringing in a
new CEO or senior management team, but here changes in
employee behavior will be more gradual and less noticeable.
In the end, it's the employees' perception of management's
values and actions that shapes Corporate Culture. Change can
come only through employees adjusting their attitudes and
beliefs about the company.
DEF'INlNG SAFETY CULTURE
Meshkati (1997) describes a Safety Culture as a system
composed of behaviors, practices, policies, and stmctural
components that emphasize Safety in an organization. The
two general components of Safety Culture are "the necessary
b e w o r k within an organization and the attitude of the staff
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at all Herent levels in respondmg to and benefiting fiom the
fr-amework."For a Safety Culture to be effective it is therefore
essential for employees to have a questioning attitude and to
be able to discuss Safety issues fieely with other members of
the organization. Within any company the organizational
culture determines the perception of safety, the relative
importance placed on safety, and the members' activities
regarding safety (Merritt & Helmreich, 1996). Implementing
a Safety Culture is a lengthy process, but senior management
cantake important steps to successfully achieve this goal. The
process includes highly visible internal activities promoting
the safety concept throughout the company and requires
continuous commitment by senior management. It's a
proactive process and there should be no exceptions.
Otherwise, employee trust is violated. The key elements in
establishing a Safety Culture include appointing safety officers
to oversee specific operations, galbering and analyzing data on
safety issues, mandating training to reinforce safety behavior,
and establishing a non-threatening system for incident
reporting. Also, open communication and feedback between
personnel and management is critical to this proactive
process. Furthermore, organizational practices determine the
attitudes and trust that individuals have in working for an
organization. These attitudes toward senior management
undoubtedly have an intluence upon the way employees
perceive the importance the organization places on safety. In
the end,only when the perceptions of corporate management
match the perceptions of the workforce can the employees
commit to the new way of "doing things" and a Safety Culture
be established.

EMPLOYEE PERCEPTIONS
While the majorlry of the employees in an organization know
the proper channels for communicating safety concerns, few
actually report every safety issue, and even fewer believe that
their safety suggestions will be acted upon (Geller, 1996).As
for the Flight Departments: there is a long tradition in aviation
that aslung for other people's opinions and reporting personal
mishaps are signs of weakness (Transport Canada, 1996).
Clearly, if there is no communication, no follow-through or
feedback, the Safety Culture suffers. Zf, on the other hand, the
organizational culture is strong and positive, pilots and other
groups will more openly discuss safety problems, and they
will be more willing to participate in associated training.
Employees can sense senior or departmentalmanagement's
philosophy toward safety through its actions and behavior. A

JAAJ% Winter 1998

4

Homan et al.: Establishing a Total Safety Culture within a Flight Department

Establishing a Total Safety Culture

whole set of indicators can show commitment to safety or lack
thereof. For example, are safety concerns addressed during
meetings, or is it just an assumed practice? How does the
leadership respond to incidents and accidents? Are mishaps
addressed orjust swept under the rug? Are victims blamed, or
does senior management investigate for possible corporate
responsibilities? These are some of the questions that will
shape the corporate Safety Culture at a firm.Unfortunately, it
often takes a major incident or accident for an organization to
review its safety policies and procedures.
MERGERS AND CULTURE SHOCK
The most spectacular growth in a company's total assets
occurs when a merger takes place. The primary motivation for
caporate mergers is to increase the economic performance of
the combined business entities. Iftwo companies merge and
then
the combined value exceeds that of each individual h,
synergy is said to exist, and such a merger supposedly benefits
all shareholders. Whether these mergers strengthen or weaken
a f m is often debated (Freivalds, 1998). Merging Werent
Corporate Cultures through reorganization has generally been
very costly for companies. Unless there is a high level of
compatibility, the process will result in Corporate Culture
shock.
JOINT FLIGHT DEPARTMENTS
Many corporations currently co-own Flight Departments to
reduce traqmtation expenses. Although consolidation of the
transportation divisions may make perfect economic sense,
shared operations come at a price. Integrating the different
Corporate Cultures at the Flight Department level can be a
challenge, especially when the separate companies used to
operate their own fleet of airplanes. Although the goals and
problems associated with the operation of a corporate aviation
department are pretty unique, Flight Departments tend to
adopt the culture of the larger corporate structure in which
they operate. As a result, the behavior of the aviation
employeesis greatly influenced by the practices, policies, and
procedures of the overall organization. In fact, pilots fkom
separate corporations may be flying together without really
knowing or understanding the Werences in flight operations
procedures. This crew pairing can create confusion in the
cockpit and set the stage for a potential incident or accident
(Carley, 1998).The dispatch policies of corporation 'X' may
be difTerent fkom those of corporation "Y,"leaving it up to a
distraught dispatcher to figure out ifhe or she can release an
airplane or not. Even worse, imagine maintenance personnel
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h m the different companies trying to settle a dspute on how
to best maintain the joint fleet. What makes these scenarios a
threat to safety is that when people lose track of their social
identity or 3he way we do things around here," they also
become more agitated. Stress levels increase and confusion
sets in. Eventually, this may lead to impaired judgments and
other high-risk human factor problems. Most Flight
Departments operate under Part 9 1 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations. This regulatory structure leaves a lot of room for
personalized operations and judgments. As a result, the
escalating trend toward mergers, acquisitions, and alliances
may indeed become a real threat to the safety of Business
Aviation.
DESIGNING THE TOTAL SAFETY CULTURE
According to Erickson (1997), the successful
implementation of a Total Safety Culture in an organization
requires attention to three critical factors: Management
Support, Management Concern and Positive Employee
Setting.
In the area of Management Support, we can identify seven
important elements that can make or break the
implementation of a Safety Culture:
1. Written Philosophy: A good indicator that
management is serious about safety performance is when a
safety statement is included in the mission statement of the
company. However, ifmanagement does not actively support
this written philosophy, then Flight Department employees
will not believe that management is sincere about safety, and
the Safety Culture may be adversely affected.
2. WorkEnvimnment:Whenthe Flight Department
is designed with safety in mind, such as extra safety features
an the airplanes and a sparkling clean hangar, employees tend
to operate the eqqment in a safe manner. This has a positive
effect on the perception of how important safety is to
management.
3. Safety OfJicialStatus: When the Safety O%icer
holds an executive position within the company, this gives a
clear indication that safety has a high priority. The level of
familiarity the Safety Officer has with the operations at the
Flight Department is also important.
4. Priority of Safeg Di.scussions: When safety issues
take a backstage to other functions in the company and
meetings about safety are canceled on a regular basis, safety
is devalued. On the other hand, if attendance of safety
briefings is mandatory and executive presence is common;
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safety will be elevated to a higher level.
5. Integration of Safeety: Senior management that is
serious about safety will make sure that safety awareness is
present throughout the company. Integration of safety policies
into the strategic planning of the company is critical to the
successful implementation of a Safety Culture. High safety
perfbrmance occurs when employees feel that safety is on an
equal footing with other concerns of the company. If the Flight
Department employees realize that senior management will
ovenide them on important issues like crew duty times and
aircraft maintenance expenses, this will be perceived as "we
arejust the Fhght DepartmenP' who is expected to "salute and
execute." Clearly, this will negatively affect the Total Safety
Culture.
6. Safety Training: When safety training is accepted
as an ongoing process rather than a one-time event, the
positive effects on the Safety Culture will be signifcant. On
the other hand, when Flight Department employees receive
safety orientation only during their first few weeks on the job,
the effects may not be as clear. Corporations that encourage
their employeesto attend seminars to improve their individual
performance tend to have a better safety recard. A Flight
Department that receives financial support for educational
activities will be a safer department.
7. Peflonnance Appraisals: Including an
employee's safety record in annual performance reviews
demonstrates mauagement's commitment to safety. However,
the informatian should not be used to blame the employee for
incidents or mishaps and should serve only as an awareness
tool to improve the system.
In the area of Management Concern, there are four elements
that can enhance the implementation of a Safety Culture:
1. SafetyKnowledge: Does management understand
what aviation safety is about? Did it have any formal training
in how to manage safety? If management feels that aviation
safety is only incidental to the mission of the company and
that it amtilutes a cost rather than a benefit, the effect on the
Safety Culture will be negative. However, if management
udemkmds the basic safety issues that involve the company's
Flight Department the effects will be positive and will
enhance the perception of a Safety Culture among the
employees.
2. Corporate Model: If senior management operates
the company using an autocratic style and treats employees as
just a means to increase production, the Safety Culture will
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fllffer. However, if management realizes that safety concerns

in the Fhght Department may closely affect other functions in
the company,then the Safety Culture will be improved. Here,
a more democratic management style may be more effective.
3. Resources: Allocation of resources to enhance
safety in the company and the Flight Department in particular
is a clear indication of the importance that senior management
places on safety. When the Flight Department needs more
people in order to maintain safety standards and senior
management denies the request based on lack of resources, the
employees' perception of the Safety Culture will be negatively
affected. Furthermore, if requests for additional aviation
personnel are rejected while other departments receive extra
manpower, the morale at the Flight Department will be
severely damaged.
4. Injuy Causation: Safety performance is lowered
when management blames employees for every incident or
aacident that occurs in the Flight Department. Assuming that
it is always the employee's fault when something goes wrong
will negatively affect the overall Safety Culture. Blaming
people also results in defensive behaviors and will result in
poor incident reporting. Conversely, when employees are not
blamed and the safety problems are looked at objectively, all
causal factors can be identified and preventive measures
instituted.
The area of Positive Employee Setting refers to the manner
in which management treats employee responses. The
following seven conditions w i l l have an important effect on
establishing and maintaining a positive Safety Culture.
1. WorkEnvironment:Management's promotion of
a clean, secure work environment at the Flight Department
will have a positive influence on the job-related behavior of
the employees. Such an environment is an indication of
management's concern for the department and will enhance
the perception of a Safety Culture.
2. Management Actions: Here, too, actions speak
louder than words. When management goes out of its way to
address safety problems, employees take notice. Also, when
management solicits advice &om the Flight Department on
safety-related issues, safety performance increases. Giving
employees some control over their work environment has a
positive effect on the Safety Culture.
3. Communication and Feedback: Clear and open
communication is very important to safety in the workplace.
The key is honest communication fiom top management. If

JAAER, Winter 1998

6

Homan et al.: Establishing a Total Safety Culture within a Flight Department

Establishing a Total Safety Culture

words are not followed by appropriate actions, an atmosphere
of distrust may develop. When senior management provides
positive feedback in response to suggestions and new ideas
h m the Flight Department, the employees will have a better
attitude toward theirjob and will sense that they have control
over their own destiny. This will create a feeling of being part
of the organization and will result in the enhancement of the
Safety Culture. Conversely, if management does not
encourage or acknowledge suggestions and new ideas,
employees will develop an attitude of "they don't listen to us
anyway" and will feel no commitment to the company.
Clearly, this would a.Bect the overall Safety Culture of the
organization.
4. Treatment of Employees: When the Flight
Department employees are treated with respect and are taken
seriously when raising a safety issue, they react in a positive
way that will enhance the overall Safety Culture. If, on the
other hand, management ignores employee input, alienation
and apathy will set in and the Safety Culture will be negatively
affected. Awarding creative thinking is a characteristic of
excellent companies. A Corporate Culture that encourages
employee suggestions creates trust among its work€orce.
When a Flight Department employee proposes an innovative
way to solve a dispatch problem and is complimented for the
suggestion, this action will stimulate an attitude of ownership
on the part of the employee and enhance the overall Safety
Culture of the company.
5 . Employee Commitment: A democratic
management style that involves cooperation and respect will
result in employees caring about their workplace. The
hierarchical approach associated with the more autocratic
style of management tends to result in alienation and an
attitude of "we just work here." This will negatively affect
employee morale, and when morale is low in the Flight
Department, unsafe behavior will become more prevalent.
Conversely, when morale is hi& synergy wilI develop, which
wiU positively affect the Safety Culture.
6. Organizational Compatibility: When the
TransportationDivision or Flight Department does not seem
to fit within the overall company structure and operates as a
complete separate entity, a subculture will develop with its
own norms and values. If these philosophical differences
between the divisions and the corporate headquarters are
taken to an extreme, counterculturesmay develop that will set
their own rules. This will have a negative effect on the Safety

Culture.
7. Ethics: Neglecting moral questions is not good for
business. Clearly, management's value system will have an
effect on the way employees perceive the Corporate Culture.
These values include trust and a sense of right and wrong
concerning the welfare of others. If the company expresses
ethical concern for employees and goes beyond the strictly
legal commitment, this will have a positive effect on the
Safety Culture, creating an atmosphere of "management cares
about us."
The Erickson (1997) study revealed that the key elements
associated with establishing an effective Total Safety Culture
were found in the area of Positive Employee Setting. The
seven elements (Work Environment, Management Actions,
Communication and Feedback, Treatment of Employees,
Employee Commitment, Organizational Compatibility, and
Ethics) were identified as most predictive of safety
performance. Obviously, if management cares about the
Flight Department employees and shows respect, these
attitudesand fet:lings will cross over and employees will start
to care about management and the bottom line. However, only
in democratic, horizontally structured corporations will this
change be successll.The more hierarchical corporationswill
require a more fundamental change before the focus can shift
to implementing a Total Safety Culture. Finally, to establish
a Total Safety Culture that permeates and encompasses both
the overall corporation and its Flight Department, senior
management has to formalize its intend by establishing a
safety culture framework within the organization. The design
of this framework should be company specific but guided by
the f111dings of the Erickson (1997) research. Clearly, the
attitude of the employees will be greatly influenced by the
rules and uncmkdy avoidance of the overall organization, as
well as the openness of the organizational culture (Meshkati,
1997).
CONCLUSIONS
A comprehensive approach to safety is required to achieve
a Total Safety Culture. Both personal and organizational
commitments are needed for success. As individuals, we must
realize the limitations and flaws of the human condition.
However, a behavior-based approach may assist us in
determinjngwhat went wrong and how to avoid incidents and
accidents in the future. Also, awareness of the five dangerous
attitudes will help us control our urge to take chances or fall
into typical behavioral traps. Finally, implementing Crew

JAAER, Winter 1998

Published by Scholarly Commons, 1998

7

Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1998], Art. 3

Establishing a Total Safety Culture

Resource Management through advanced teamwork and
proper communication will enhance our ability to control
errors in the Flight Department.
On an organizational level, we have to be aware of the
constantly changing corporate climate. Current business
trends like mergers and acquisitions may result in Corporate
Culture clashes that will create very confusing and often
dangerous workplace conditions. To counter this and other
potential threats to safety, corporations should strive for the
highest level of protection: a fully integrated safety program
that is part of the overall philosophy of the company and one
that values the concerns and inputs of all employees. Such a
program would then form the basis for the creation of a Total
Safety Culture within the company. Building on this

foundation senior management should then address the key
elements in establishing a Safety Culture by appointing a
Safety Oiiicer. This individual's tasks will be to gather data
on safety issues, to develop training to reinforce safety
behavior, and to establish a non-threatening system for
incident reporting. Moreover, to be effective, the Safety
Officer should concentrate on the area of Positive Employee
Setting identified in the Erickson (1997) research. Clearly,
open channels of communication between personnel and the
Safety Oflicer will be critical in this process. In the end,
contml of safe operations in an organizational slructure like a
Flight Department is a continuous process that requires both
personal and organizational commitment, well-dehed
feedback, and teamwork.0
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